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UNVEILING THE MASK OF PHISHING:
THREATS, PREVENTIVE MEASURES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Indranil Bose
Alvin Chung Man Leung
School of Business
The University of Hong Kong
bose@business.hku.hk
ABSTRACT
Phishing, a new-rise identity fraud of this century has already caused huge financial loss and
social disorder. This paper provides an overview of the evolution and forecasted trend of phishing
activities with detailed analysis on common phishing features, proliferation channels, relevant
anti-phishing measures, related legislation, and an anti-phishing framework from the perspective
of social responsibility. The objective of the research is to enhance public awareness of phishing
and to inform end users and owners of e-commerce sites proper measures to detect and prevent
this criminal activity.
Keywords: anti-phishing, authentication, bogus Web sites, identity theft, fraudulent e-mail,
phishing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Web is one of the most popular media for handling financial transactions in the new
millennium. As it is a more efficient medium than conventional banking channels many people
own one or more electronic bank accounts for monetary transactions. However, the new medium
brings with it many new dangers. Phishing is one such new-rise online crime that aims to steal
personal identity data and financial account credentials [Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)
2006]. Making use of the Internet, the adversary spreads e-mails to the general public to entice
them to click on embedded links to bogus Web sites and in the process retrieves their usernames
and passwords when they input their data at the bogus Web site. About 5 percent of phishing email recipients respond to fraudulent e-mails [APWG 2006]. In another study conducted by
Gartner, it was found that 57 million Internet users in the U.S. received e-mails related to phishing
scams, and phishers were able to successfully entice about 2 million people to release their
sensitive information [Kirda and Kruegel 2005]. The number of phishing incidents reported in the
past few years is on a steady rise. A report released by APWG in 2006 claims that from
December 2004 to December 2005, phishing incidents have grown at an astonishing rate of
72.66 percent. More surprisingly, during 2004 the number of reported phishing incidents has risen
nearly 4,000 percent in just 6 months [James 2005]. It is an alarming situation, and action needs
to be taken to prevent the proliferation of such a dangerous crime.
The main driving force behind this crime is the lucrative amount of money involved in online
transactions. In a study conducted by Gartner, it was reported that for the year ending April 2004,
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there were 1.8 million phishing attacks that caused financial loss worth U.S. $1.2 billion [Geer
2005]. In a single phishing incident that affected HSBC Hong Kong in October 2004, the total
financial loss amounted to HK$66,000 and the incident affected a dozen customers [Richardson
2004]. The ubiquity of the Internet technology has made phishing an easy crime to accomplish.
Setting up a bogus Web site does not require a lot of money or effort, and existing technology
allows one to clone a genuine Web site at minimum cost and in little time.
In the next section, we provide a background of phishing. In the third section, we talk about some
common characteristics of phishing followed by some ways to identify phishing, general
guidelines to prevent this crime, and a description of relevant anti-phishing technologies. Next, we
detail the latest trends in phishing attacks and counter measures. The following section lists the
corporate and individual social responsibilities against phishing and proposes a suitable antiphishing framework. Finally we conclude this paper with some advice on protection strategies
against phishing.
II. BACKGROUND OF PHISHING
The term phishing first appeared on the alt.2600 hacker newsgroup in January 1996. The word
“phishing” consists of two parts – “ph” and “ishing.” In the past, hackers commonly used the
letters “ph” to mean “phone phreaking.” In the hacker terminology, “ph” replaced the letter “f.” The
letter “f” joining the second word “ishing” (i.e. “fishing”) describes the action of phishing, which
means using bait to allure people. The first incidence of phishing can be traced back to the
American Online (AOL) theft case that occurred in 1995 [James 2005]. Throughout the past
decade, techniques of phishing have evolved a lot with the advancement of technology.
The most commonly used channel of phishing is e-mail. Making use of the loop hole of Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the phisher can arbitrarily set the “mail from” and “reply to”
headers to impersonate another person, especially staff members of a financial institution.
Phishers either ask victims to reply to the e-mail with confidential information or click on a link in
the e-mail to a bogus Web site that can trap personal information. In the bogus Web sites the
phishers typically use logos and trademarks downloaded from genuine Web sites.
The second channel to spread phishing messages is via instant messengers. Online
communication software like ICQ, MSN Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, etc. provides an
excellent channel for peer-to-peer communication and broadcasting. Figure 1 illustrates an
example of phishing message sent via ICQ. Phisher (called “Anonymous” in the example) may
pretend to be a friend and spreads mass ICQ messages to entice people to click on the hyperlink
to a phishing site that contains malicious programs or that resembles another popular Web site
which the victim frequents from time to time. Once the user goes to the Web site (say
www.phishing.com) the phisher will steal the user’s personal information covertly or the phishing
Web site that resembles a genuine one will request login information from the user.
The third popular channel for phishing is through malicious programs. Computer viruses that
damage software and hardware of personal computers and Trojan, which provides a backdoor for
remote access and control to an unauthorized third party, also belong to this category [Kienzle
and Elder 2003]. Usually phishers send those programs as attachments using mass e-mail or
through instant messengers. Once the malicious programs gain access to the victims’ computers,
they can steal personal information of victims and send them to the adversary surreptitiously.
When these programs affect a large number of PCs, a wide phishing network is formed. Hijacked
servers are used as servers to host bogus Web sites and spread phishing e-mails.
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Figure 1. Example of Phishing Message Sent via Instant Messenger
The fourth phishing method is through Web-based delivery. Once a victim enters a Web site by
clicking onto the link embedded in an e-mail or message of an instant messenger, malicious
programs will be implanted on the computer of the victim that steal his/her private information
once they conduct online transactions using the same computer. The transfer of malicious
programs from the Web to a computer is difficult unless the user is careless and opens a
suspicious file. By making use of pop-ups, frameless windows or zero-sized contaminated
graphics it is easy to make the transfer unnoticeable to the user. Phishing channels such as email and instant messenger are the most popular and they account for 90 percent of the phishing
attacks. Malicious programs and Web-based malicious program delivery lead to 10 percent of
phishing attacks. In December 2005, APWG recorded 180 cases of password stealing malicious
code (unique applications) and 1912 password stealing malicious code URLs [APWG 2006].
In addition to these well-known paths, phishers have recently started to use a new trick called
pharming [Madsen et al. 2005]. Instead of targeting individual customers of financial institutions,
phishers hack Domain Name Servers (DNS) and change the pointer of the server from a genuine
Web site to a bogus one. When users surf the Web, the DNS convert the Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) they type in the address bar of the browser to binary address. When the DNS entry
is modified, as the user types in the correct URL of a financial institution, the browser directs
him/her to a bogus Web site. As pharming is very sophisticated and difficult to detect, experts
believe that pharming will outgrow phishing in future.
Though techniques of phishing vary, the main idea is the same. A phisher tries different methods
to make victims believe that he/she is a trustable third party and make them open an e-mail, click
an embedded link, download attached documents or give away personal information. In the next
section, we provide an in-depth analysis of phishing attacks and relevant anti-phishing measures.
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III. COMMON PHISHING TECHNIQUES
If one is careful enough, phishing attacks can be easily spotted. In this section, we discuss
various ways to identify possible phishing tricks based on common features of phishing e-mails.

Figure 2. Example of Phishing E-mail

Figure 2 shows a typical phishing e-mail. Usually, a phishing e-mail may possess some special
features as shown in Table 1.
SPELLING MISTAKES
A common feature of phishing e-mails is that they usually contain some obvious spelling
mistakes. Sometimes the difference between the incorrect and correct spellings may be a
difference in the position of alphabet and the difference is so subtle that it remains unnoticed by
unsuspecting users.
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Table 1. Features of Phishing E-mail Shown in Figure 2
1.

Spelling mistake

Instead of HSBC, phisher wrongly spells HSCB

2.

Strange words in “From” field

alert@hsbc.com.hk, where “alert” usually does not
appear in normal company circulated e-mails

3.

Clickable link

http://hsbc.com.hk

4.

Unmatched Web address

When one places a cursor over a clickable link, which
appears to be true, the real address at the bottom of
the browser shows otherwise. In the above example:
http://phishing.com obviously does not match that of
http://hsbc.com.hk

5.

Special characters in hyperlinks

http://hscb.com.hk%123.123.123.123/online contains
special characters “%” and numeric addresses
“123.123.123.123”, which may be an example of
scripting language trick

6.

Random name or e-mail address

Phishers usually use computer programs to generate
phishing e-mails randomly. Due to program bugs some
random names or e-mail addresses may appear in the
content of e-mail. In the above example, the e-mail
content contains a random e-mail address: person@emailserverhk.com

UNMATCHED LOGOS
In order to enhance the trustworthiness of the e-mail, phishers usually include a company logo.
Sometimes there exist some subtle differences between the forged logo in the phishing e-mail
and the genuine one. Often the difference may be in the color of the logo.
TITLES OF “FROM” FIELD
In some phishing e-mails, although the domain name of the sender is the same as that of a
genuine company, the “from” field may contain some wordings like “alert” and “danger,” for
instance, alert@citibank.com. It is the duty of the e-mail recipient to check whether the username
of the sender makes sense or not.
E-MAIL HEADERS
In some phishing examples, the header of the e-mails received do not match that of the company
being forged. As many people do not pay attention to e-mail headers, it is easy for phishers to
allow this to happen.
RANDOM NAMES IN BODY OF E-MAIL
Phishers generate phishing e-mails using computer programs. Hence, it may happen that due to
some program bug, some random name or e-mail address may appear in the body of the forged
e-mail. If one goes through the content of the e-mail carefully, it can be spotted easily.
CLICKABLE LINKS
One of the major traps in a phishing e-mail is a clickable URL which usually leads to a bogus
Web site. Phishers use the in-built function of HTML to disguise the actual address of the (URL).
For
example,
let
us
consider
the
HTML
trick
<a
href=http://fakebank.com>http://www.realbank.com</a>. Under this scheme, though the genuine
URL http://www.realbank.com appears in the text of the e-mail, the default Web browser directs
the recipient to a bogus Web site http://fakebank.com.
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SPECIAL CHARACTERS IN HYPERLINKS
Apart from URL many phishing e-mails also contain some hyperlinks with special characters such
as “%”, number or “@.”Phishers usually try to use vulnerabilities of the Web browser or HTML
built-in functions. Some old browsers ignore the first part of address before symbol “@.”If one
clicks a hyperlink such as http://realbank.com@www.123.123.123.123, he/she will be directed to
www.123.123.123.123 instead of http://realbank.com.
INCORRECT URLS
Bogus Web sites usually do not possess the same URL as real ones even though the content
may appear the same. In general, a forged Web address is in numeric form, for instance
http://123.456.789.012. Sometimes an adversary may register a domain name which looks quite
similar to the actual one but is actually not the same one. Instead of http://realbank.com a bogus
Web site may have an address with an extra character such as http://realbanke.com or have
some characters in reverse order as in http://realbnak.com. This minor mistake is sometimes
difficult to detect by a user.
ABSENCE OF SERVER CERTIFICATES
Though one can easily clone the content of a Web site, it is difficult to forge a server certificate.
Checking the pad lock at the bottom of a Web browser may reveal that it is a fake one and does
not link to the server certificate.
IV. MEASURES AGAINST PHISHING
In order to better protect customers, many financial institutions send mass e-mail instructing
customers to be aware of phishing. Furthermore, some companies also take a proactive
approach to combat potential phishing attacks. In this section we discuss the various measures
adopted by companies to combat the threat of phishing.
E-MAIL SCAN
In order to better protect customers or employees, some e-mail service providers (ESP) set up
filters to get rid of potential phishing e-mails. Cyota set up an Anti Fraud Command Centre in
Israel with 30 security analysts. Each day, they scanned 1 billion incoming e-mails and checked
for signs of phishing [Knight 2005]. Using this proactive e-mail scan ESPs can filter out suspicious
phishing e-mails and prevent them from reaching the destined e-mail recipients.
MONITORING TRANSACTION LOGS
Phishers usually target a number of customers. Once they retrieve personal information such as
usernames and passwords of adequate number of customers of a particular financial institution
they try to withdraw money from the accounts of victims. Some companies have set up a special
team for monitoring daily transaction logs. If various transactions of different accounts are
conducted from the same IP address, the company may suspend action from that IP address and
take immediate action against it. If a transaction involving a large amount of money occurs at a
particular location which is not the usual location where the customer makes transactions the
company may suspend the account and investigate the case by calling back the customer.
MONITORING TRAFFIC FLOWS
Another measure to inhibit phishing before real implementation takes place is to keep track of any
person who clones a company Web page or downloads company logos or files in large numbers.
Usually phishers use software to clone a Web page or download large number of logos and files
so as to construct a seemingly true Web site. If they conduct a series of downloading activities
from a single IP address that address is recorded on the server log file. A program can be set up
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by the security team to alert relevant members of staff if such an action happens. Corillian Fraud
Detection System is software that looks for suspicious access patterns from Web log files [Geer
2005].
PROACTIVE SCANNING OF WEB SITES
Many companies pay security companies to look for potential phishing Web sites in the market.
Security companies usually carry out Internet search, chat room monitoring, or domain name
registration checks to see if anyone newly registers a Web site or owns a Web site with similar
domain name. They compare the visual similarity of those newly found Web sites with their
customers’ Web sites, and if they find one Web site they ask the ISP to shut down the Web site or
notify all customers to watch out for it [Liu et al. 2005].
POISONING PHISHING WEB SITES
Once a person finds a phishing Web site, it may happen that some customers have already given
away their personal information. In order to minimize the financial impact to all customers, a
company can send a huge amount of fake information to the phishing Web site. This can
overwhelm the traffic of the bogus Web site and prevent other customers from giving away their
confidential information to the Web site. At the same time it can also dilute the actual customer
data collected so far so that the phishing site is unable to discover which account information are
true and which are false. Computer professionals describe such a process as poisoning a
phishing Web site [Geer 2005].
Table 2 provides a summary of the features provided by the different anti-phishing measures.
Table 2. Various Anti-Phishing Measures Adopted by Companies
Anti-phishing measures

Main features

E-mail scan

Filter out phishing prone e-mails and reduce the chance
of phishing

Transaction log monitoring

Monitor abnormal transactions stored in server logs and
investigate if phishing has occurred

Traffic flow monitoring

Monitor abnormal online traffic flows one can catch
phishers before the crime begins (e.g., series of
downloading activities from a particular IP)

Proactive Web scanning

Check the visual and domain name similarity of newly
registered Web sites and existing Web sites to deter
phishing Web sites from burgeoning

Poisoning phishing Web

Submit chunks of garbage information to the phishing
Web site so as to dilute the actual data already gathered
by the site and to thwart further phishing activity by
overwhelming traffic flow to the site

V. ANTI-PHISHING TOOLS
Phishing is complicated in nature. It is true that manual human effort is not sufficient to detect the
various types of phishing attacks. Some anti-phishing applications for individual customers and
companies may be useful to deter such kind of activities. Their functionalities and areas of
prevention vary a lot. In this section we discuss the various types of anti-phishing applications.
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ANTI-MALICIOUS PROGRAM SOFTWARE
Malicious programs such as viruses and Trojan are common tools used by phishers to steal
confidential information. In the past, phishing e-mails contained malicious programs. In recent
times, due to the prevalence of virus filtering e-mail servers, malicious programs have become
more prevalent on phishing Web sites. Once a person visits a phishing Web site the malicious
program may get implanted in the computer of victim and pose a threat of potential information
leakage. In order to combat these programs, it is recommended that one install anti-virus
software with constant updates as well as firewall on his/her computer.
ANTI-SPAM FILTER
Many companies install spam filters to protect internal employees. As reflected in the study of
Kenyon College, introduction of spam filters was able to stop a significant number of attempts to
commit identity theft from getting through users’ e-mail [Murphy 2005]. For individual customers,
there are many free spam filters available like Anti-Spam Filter and AllSpamGone Spam Killer
Anti Spam. Open source software like Clear Search Anti-phishing and E-mail Xray can be used to
filter out suspicious e-mails by comparing them with those available in the software’s phishing
libraries. For instant messengers, many vendors have launched features that prevent phishing
(e.g., SpamGuard in Yahoo Messenger).
PASSWORD MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Although password is one of the most commonly adopted means to protect a user’s account
information, most customers are used to giving away their passwords easily. Some software
based protection measures can help in user password management. Whenever a user logs onto
a system, the special software will automatically fill in a relevant field on the Web site. As the
software will recognize a Web site by its actual IP address, if a user goes to a phishing Web site,
the password field will not be auto-filled. Some password management software has additional
powerful features as well. Whenever a user creates a new account, this software will add IPspecific characters to the password field. When users go to a Web site and supply a password
the IP-specific characters will be appended automatically. In this way even if a customer leaks
his/her own password, the adversary cannot steal the account information of customers because
what the customer knows is only part of the password. Some commonly used password
management applications are PwdHash, SpoofGuard, AntiPhish, [Kirda and Kruegel 2005],
PVault [Jammalamadaka et al. 2005].
TRUSTED PATH ENSURED BROWSER
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) represents a trusted path between browser and Web server and is a
strong protection against leakage of sensitive information. However SSL can be forged. Ye et al.
demonstrated that the adversary can camouflage a secure Web session by simply creating an
illusion that the browser has already displayed signals that a genuine SSL will display [Ye et al.
2005]. The adversary can also use scripting language to hide or display a fake URL in the
address bar. Ye et al. suggested Synchronized Random Dynamic (SRD) boundaries that can
ensure trusted path exists so that the users can distinguish between genuine status of messages
from the browser itself and maliciously crafted content from the server. Dhamija and Tygar
proposed an extension of Mozilla Firefox called Dynamic Security Skins that makes use of
graphical pictures to visually determine if a trusted path exists or not. The authentication process
takes place in two steps. First, a remote server generates a graphical picture. Then, the browser
extension with Dynamic Security Skins generates another graphical picture that it expects to
receive from the server. To authenticate the content, one needs to verify if the two images match.
It is difficult for a phishing site to predict the image to be displayed in the Web browser. Therefore,
even when a phisher captures a picture that is displayed on a genuine site, the chance that the
same picture will appear again is very low. By comparing the pictures generated by both the
server and the remote browser one can determine the existence of a trusted path [Dhamija and
Tygar 2005].
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DIGITALLY SIGNED E-MAIL
In order to defend against phishing, Garfinkel et al. suggested that Internet users should adopt
digitally signed mail. Digitally signed e-mail makes use of asymmetric key cryptography such as
RSA and allows one to clearly distinguish the identity of sender. The ideology behind the scheme
is that each user owns a pair of public key and private key [Boncella 2000]. Only the genuine user
can sign a message with his/her own private key while the receiver can validate the originality of
the message by using a relevant public key that is readily available to the public from a trustable
third party. Under this scheme, even when a phisher claims to be a member of the staff of a
certain company they cannot forge the signed message without the private key. Therefore,
authentication using digitally signed e-mails is a strong measure against phishing [Garfinkel et al.
2005].
ALIAS E-MAIL ADDRESS
Phishers typically use e-mail crawler programs that collect e-mail addresses from the Internet.
Another approach is direct purchase of e-mail addresses from business entities that do not care
about the privacy of their customers. Kawashima et al. suggested the use of alias e-mail
addresses to prevent e-mail abuse. Under the scheme proposed by them, ESPs may possess a
database consisting of actual and alias addresses of a customer together with relevant tracking
IDs [Kawashima et al. 2005]. When a company wants to send mass e-mail, ESP may give it a list
of alias addresses together with corresponding tracking ID. When the company sends e-mail, the
ESP will convert the alias to actual address and deliver the e-mail to the final recipients. If spam
is found, ESP will use the tracking ID accompanying the e-mail alias and trace back the source of
e-mail leakage. In this way the identity of the end user can be preserved.
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF
Verification of one’s identity without letting the third party know the identification is the main
interest of security analysts. Zero-knowledge proof is one such method that allows a third party to
verify the identity of a user without knowing anything related to the secret. It is effective in
deterring playback attacks where the adversary intercepts a password sent by a customer to a
company and impersonates the customer by using the same password in the next transaction
[Viega 2005]. An important way to implement zero-knowledge proof is by the use of challengeresponse tokens. Under this method, it is assumed that a customer knows answers (or
responses) to all questions (or challenges) posed by the server. The server first asks several
questions randomly out of a large database of questions. If a customer can answer all of them
correctly then he/she is an authenticated user. If the adversary happens to intercept the set of
answers it does not mean he/she can impersonate the true person, because all the questions are
posed randomly.
2-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
Traditionally in order to provide authentication one has to memorize a password. If a third party
knows the password an account gets compromised. In order to correct the inefficiency of
password authentication, 2-factor authentication is suggested. To authenticate oneself, one must
prove what one knows and what one has. “What you know” refers to the password that people
use conventionally. “What you have” is something that is possessed only by the genuine user.
This can include a hardware token that generates different Personal Identification Numbers
(PINs) at different times. In the following paragraphs we describe the different means by which
the user can prove “what you have.”
Hardware Security Box
In Sweden, a security box is distributed to customers of most banks for user verification [Nilsson
et al. 2005]. When a user logs on to an Internet banking site, he/she has to supply a password
(“what you know”) and a personal PIN from a security box (“what you have”). The device
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generates a random number based on an initial seed that serves as the PIN for the user. Banks
in Hong Kong such as HSBC and Hang Seng Bank offer this kind of service.
One Time Password (OTP)
OTP is a random number generated by a company. Once it is used or once a certain amount of
time has elapsed the password is discarded. When a customer of a bank conducts a high-risk
transaction, the bank will supply an OTP through an alternative channel like the customers’
mobile phone via Short Message Service (SMS). To carry out the transaction, the user will need
to supply both the PIN and an OTP. This strategy is excellent in preventing play back attacks.
Even though a hacker traps an OTP during an online transaction to a bank, the trapped password
cannot be used for a second time. If an OTP is trapped by a phishing site after a period of time it
becomes invalid. Banks in Hong Kong such as Bank of China and Standard Chartered Bank offer
this service.
Personal Certificate
Personal certificate is a type of implementation of RSA asymmetric cryptography. The RSA
scheme produces a pair of private and public keys. Personal certificate is a signed document with
a person’s name and a signature signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) private key that can be
verified by CA’s public key. Only those who register to a CA are given a personal certificate.
Therefore, the identity of a person stated on the certificate is guaranteed by CA. In order to verify
oneself to a company, one has to present his/her personal certificate apart from supplying a
password. The company retrieves a public key from the CA and verifies the correctness of the
signature on the certificate and in this way verifies the identity of the person. Bank of China and
DBS Bank in Hong Kong allow Internet banking users to verify their identity using personal
certificates.
Table 3. Types of Anti-Phishing Applications with Examples
Types of anti-phishing
applications

Examples

Anti-malicious software

Anti-virus: Norton Anti-Virus, McAfee Anti-Virus
Firewall: Sygate Firewall, ZoneAlarm

Anti-spam filter

E-mail spam filters: Anti-Spam Filter, AllSpamGone Spam
Killer Anti Spam
Anti-phishing filters: Clear Search Anti-phishing, E-mail Xray

Password management tools

PwdHash, SpoofGuard, AntiPhish, Pvault

Trusted
browser

Synchronized Random Dynamic (SRD) boundaries, Dynamic
Security Skins browser plug-in

path

ensured

Digitally signed e-mail

RSA cryptography

Alias e-mail address

E-mail alias with tracking ID

Zero-knowledge proof

Challenge response token

2-factor authentication

Conventional passwords with any of the following: Hardware
security box, OTP, personal certificate

Multi-factor authentication

Any 2-factor authentication mechanism plus biometric features
recognition
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Multi-Factor Authentication
Based on the ideology of “what you know, what you have, and what you are,” multi-factor
authentication is often identified as a combination of knowledge-based authentication, possession
based authentication, and biometrics based authentication [Zviran and Erlich 2006]. Unique
biometric features are usually the extra properties that need to be verified. A common 3-factor
authentication mechanism may include verification of password, OTP, and the user’s finger print.
Other types of biometric technologies can include face recognition, hand geometry, iris scanning,
retina scanning, and voice recognition, among others [Boukhonine et al. 2005]. This mechanism
is suitable for those highly confidential transactions that require highest level of authentication.
Table 3 provides a summary of the various anti-phishing measures with examples of each
measure.
VI. EVALUATION OF ANTI-PHISHING TECHNIQUES
In Section V we discussed several anti-phishing techniques. In this section we evaluate the
capabilities and limitations of each technique from the user perspective and draw a comparison
between them.
Anti-malicious programs are the most rudimentary and popular tools to protect users against
phishing. However, the price and user-friendliness of the different products varies. Although the
adoption rate of anti-malicious programs is high many users neglect to update the virus definition
files on a regular basis. As a result, users may not get full protection at all times. However antimalicious programs only offer protection against malware. Phishers can still entice users with
tricks such as phishing e-mails and bogus Web sites. Therefore, it is not enough to install antimalicious programs as the only tools to fight phishing.
Anti-spam software is another protection tool. Some service providers install the software in their
e-mail servers to filter potential phishing e-mails. For better protection individual users should
install such a tool on their e-mail handler such as Outlook Express. However users need to
update the spam library frequently to keep it up to date. Furthermore, anti-spam software cannot
do much against attacks from bogus Web sites and Web-based malware.
Password management tools and trusted path ensured browsers are newer application programs
that help in the prevention of phishing. Due to their newness, the adoption rate of such programs
is not very high. Nevertheless, they are effective tools against bogus Web sites if the users pay
attention to the warnings issued by these software tools. Most of these programs are open source
and easy to install. However, these programs cannot offer protection against malware and
phishing e-mails.
In order to deter phishing e-mails, digitally signed e-mail is an effective tool for user
authentication. Users should apply for a private and public key from CA and this involves some
expenditure on behalf of users. Also users should take special care of the private key and make it
inaccessible to any third party. At present the adoption of digitally signed e-mail is not high, and it
cannot fully protect users from Web-based malware and bogus Web sites.
Alias e-mail address is a useful way to cut off the source of e-mail addresses to phishers.
However, maintenance of the alias e-mail database requires extra effort and high operating costs.
Therefore, not many service providers adopt it. Again, it cannot fully protect users from Webbased malware and bogus Web sites.
User authentication is one of the key protective measures against phishing and identity theft.
Zero-knowledge proof, 2-factor authentication, and multi-factor authentication are techniques
specially designed for user authentication. But the implementation cost for these techniques is
generally high, because it is necessary to install special hardware devices. For multi-factor
authentication, the equipment cost can be many times higher than that for other methods
depending on the level of authentication required. However, in some situations, even the three
methods working in unison cannot offer thorough protection. In case of the man-in-the-middle
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type of attack, the adversary can impersonate the victim by sending all the credentials supplied
by the victim to the authentication server. Upon successful authentication, the adversary can gain
full control of the user’s account.
Table 4. Comparison of Different Anti-Phishing Techniques
Characteristics

Target

Level of
difficulty
of use

Constraints

Potential
phishing
attacks

Rate of
adoption by
users

Cost of
implementation

Anti-malicious
program

Malware

Low to
medium

Constant virus
update

Phishing email or
bogus Web
sites

High

Low to
medium

Anti-spam filter

Spam and
phishing
e-mail

Low

Constant
update of spam
library

Web-based
malware

Medium

Low to
medium

Password
management tools

Bogus
Web sites

Low

User should not
intentionally
give away
personal
information

Web-based
or e-mail
attached
malware

Low

Low

Trusted path
ensured browser

Bogus
Web sites

Low

User pays
attention to
indication of
trusted path

Web-based
or e-mail
attached
malware

Low

Low

Digitally signed email

Phishing
e-mail

Low

Personal
certificate of
sender is not
compromised

Web-based
malware

Low

Medium

Alias e-mail
address

Phishing
e-mail

Low

Alias e-mail
database is not
hacked

Web-based
malware

Low

Medium

Zero-knowledge
proof

User
authenticcation

Low

Only genuine
users know and
posses secret
keys

Man-in-themiddle
attack

Medium

High

2-factor
authentication

User
authentication

Low

Only genuine
users know and
posses secret
keys

Man-in-themiddle
attack

Medium

High

Multi-factor
authentication

User
authentication

High

Only genuine
users know and
posses secret
keys and other
biometric
features

Man-in-themiddle
attack

Low

Extremely
high

Antiphishing
techniques

Table 4 provides a comparison of the different anti-phishing techniques. It leads us to conclude
that none of them can offer full-fledged protection against phishing. It is necessary to install more
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than one anti-phishing tool so as to complement the inadequacies of others. The adoption of the
tools depends on the situation and needs of the user. For users who are unaware of incoming emails, anti-spam filter is a preferred technique. Companies that use e-mail as the major means of
business communication between partners and customers should consider the use of digitally
signed e-mail to prevent phishers from gaining access to true e-mail addresses of e-mail
recipients. To give protection against
malware anti-malicious programs are necessary. To thwart information leak to bogus Web sites, it
is important to install password management tools and trusted-path ensured browsers. For safe
online transactions, tools implementing zero-knowledge proof and 2-factor authentication are a
must. In extremely critical circumstances that need the highest level of authentication, multi-factor
authentication becomes compulsory. In order to have a thorough protection against phishing, we
recommend that users install at least one application program in each anti-phishing category.
Combating phishing is a social responsibility. In the next section, we describe how corporations
and individuals can utilize anti-phishing tools and measures to achieve that goal.
VII. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES AGAINST PHISHING
Being a part of the global community, both corporations and individuals have certain social
responsibilities to fight phishing. In this section, we discuss the importance of those social
responsibilities from the corporate and individual perspectives and investigate how we can
achieve comprehensive anti-phishing protection from a social and legal perspective.
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Company owners have the duty to protect their customers by adopting adequate security
measures to prevent any foreseeable crime due to a variety of reasons. Phishing undermines four
fundamental Information Systems security objectives, namely “maximize privacy,” “maximize
access control,” “enhance integrity of business process,” and “maximize data integrity” [Dhillon
and Torkzadeh 2006] and puts customers’ personal information and safety of online transactions
in danger. In fact, anti-phishing is one of the corporate social responsibilities (CSR) generally
expected by the global community. Failure to take up CSR may deteriorate a company’s goodwill
and public image, and these qualities are difficult to remediate once lost [Joyner and Payne
2002]. This may even lead to lower profitability as CSRs are generally perceived as critical
advantages of a company by most CEOs [Simms 2002; Ogrizek 2002]. Some regional laws such
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of the U.S. require companies to adopt effective measures to
protect customers’ financial data [Anderson 2006]. Being socially responsible corporations,
company owners have responsibilities to comply with the laws and safeguard customers’
personal data by thwarting phishing attacks.
Individuals also have social responsibilities to fulfill in the battle against phishing. They should
protect personal data by taking a number of important steps. They should install the latest
versions of anti-phishing software, and remain watchful of incoming messages. They should not
click on embedded hyperlinks in e-mails. Any active content enabling options, such as ActiveX,
Java, JavaScript, and cookies, available in e-mail applications or browsers should be turned off
whenever necessary [Lininger and Vines 2005]. Anti-phishing requires collaborative effort of all
parties involved, and individuals play an important role in reporting any evidences of phishingrelated activities. Being dutiful members of the society, individuals have the responsibility to alert
others about the dangers of potential phishing attacks. Based on the previous discussion, we can
categorize corporate and individual social responsibilities in the context of anti-phishing into three
main areas, namely combating phishing at all stages of activity, complying with legal obligations
to safeguard personal data, and adopting standards for anti-phishing.
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UNDERSTANDING THE PHASES OF PHISHING
Phishing can be categorized into four phases: preparation, mass broadcast, mature, and account
hijack. In the preparation phase, phishers build up bogus Web sites that look similar to genuine
ones to lure unaware customers. In the second stage of mass broadcast, phishers target general
public or specific customers of companies by retrieving relevant e-mail addresses from the
Internet via e-mail crawler programs or purchasing them from spam vendors. In the mature phase
that usually lasts about five days, phishers wait for victims to take the bait of fake e-mail and give
away personal information at a spurious Web site. In the final phase of account, hijack phishers
use trapped personal data to withdraw money from victims. There are four different ways to
combat the crime of phishing in its four phases respectively. These include prohibition of bogus
Web sites, thwarting the spread of phishing messages, preservation of data privacy, and
deterrence of identity theft. Figure 3 provides an anti-phishing framework that shows which
countermeasures and techniques should be adopted at which stage of phishing.
Table 5. Examples of Anti-Phishing Laws across the Globe
Types of antiphishing laws

Examples of anti-phishing laws

Thwarting the
spread of phishing
messages

- CAN-SPAM Act (18 U.S.C. § 1037) (US)
- Data Protection Directive (European Union)
- E-Privacy Directive (European Union)

Prohibition of
bogus Web sites

- Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 528) (HK)
- Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) (US)
- Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights
(Article 10, Convention on Cybercrime)

Preservation of
data privacy

- Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) (HK)
- Telecommunication Ordinance (Cap. 106) (HK)
- Telecommunication Privacy Directive (European Union)
- E-Privacy Directive (European Union)
- Data Interference (Article 4, Convention on Cybercrime)
- System interference (Article 5, Convention on Cybercrime)

Deterrence of
identity theft

- Crime Ordinance (Cap. 200) (HK)
- Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210)
- Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (18 U.S.C. § 1028)
(US)
- Credit card fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1029) (US)
- Bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) (US)
- Computer fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)) (US)
- Computer-related fraud (Article 8, Convention on Cybercrime)

LEGISLATION AGAINST PHISHING
Legislation usually follows the social trend to protect the general interest of all citizens [Ogrizek
2002]. Throughout the world, governments have adopted a variety of anti-phishing laws that can
be categorized into four types. The first type includes legislation that thwarts the spread of
phishing messages. The CAN-SPAM Act adopted by the U.S. federal government is an example
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of this [Hladjk 2005]. The second type of legislation prohibits the setup of bogus Web sites with
an intention to deceive people. The Wire Fraud Act in the U.S. (18 U.S.C. § 1343), which
prohibits anyone “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses” is an example of this
category [Chawki 2006]. The third type of anti-phishing laws is geared toward preservation of
data privacy. The Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) of Hong Kong belongs to this
category. The fourth type of legislation deters identity theft like the Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act (18 U.S.C. § 1028) in the U.S. Table 5 lists several legislation currently in place in
the U.S., Hong Kong, European Union, and Convention on Cybercrime that consists of member
countries Canada, Japan, South Africa, U.S., and 15 states of the Council of Europe.
Apart from the above laws safeguarding public interests from phishing attacks, companies in
some countries have special legal obligations to fulfill. In the state of California, U.S., companies
have the obligation to report any breaches in computer security according to the state law
SB1386 [Getronics 2005]. U.S. financial services and insurance companies are also obliged to
report any suspicious transactions as part of anti-money laundering regulations according to the
U.S. Patriot Act [Getronics 2005]. Finally, U.S. companies are obligated to adopt reasonable
security and privacy policies and practices. Otherwise, they are likely to face prosecution from
consumer protection authorities for deceptive trade practices [Matsuura 2004]. With the
prevalence of these different types of legislation, it has become imperative for companies to
provide customers with better protection in terms of privacy preservation and security
enhancement.
ROLE OF STANDARDS
Companies and individuals are often harassed by concerns such as confidentiality, integrity,
availability, auditability, reliability, and amount of security necessary to achieve highest level of
information security [Gerber et al. 2001]. In order to address these concerns, many international
standards committees have developed security standards. A comprehensive theory of
Information Security Management (ISM) should consist of five elements, namely integrated
security policy theory, risk management theory, control and auditing theory, management system
theory, and contingency theory [Hong et al. 2003]. Covering various essential aspects of ISM,
many IS security standards have come into existence. Table 6 summarizes the major standards
and areas related to anti-phishing.
Several organizations have started playing an important role in the development of standards and
best practices that are geared toward anti-phishing. One of the organizations that is playing a
pioneering role in educating the general public about the dangers of phishing is the Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG), which consists of over 400 members from approximately 25 companies
and includes banks, ISPs, e-commerce and e-business related businesses as their members.
They provide anti-phishing resources as well as monthly phishing reports. The National Cyber
Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA) is a U.S.-based organization dedicated to promoting
security awareness among the general public. The Financial and Banking Infrastructure
Committee (FBIC) works with the Department of Defense in the U.S. to fight financial crimes and
with members from financial institutions and regulatory agencies to improve the security of their
infrastructures. Other organizations like the Federal Trade Commission, Financial Services
Technology Consortium, and Global Infrastructure Alliance for Internet Security also provide
useful information and advice related to anti-phishing.
Although no one can deny the importance of standards, it is somewhat problematic to implement
a uniform standard throughout the globe. Countries throughout the world need to collaborate with
each other for this purpose. Phishing is borderless. A bogus Web site may be hosted in a
developing country with loosely defined anti-phishing laws while phishing e-mails are distributed
to developed countries causing tremendous economic loss. Adversaries may take advantage of a
host country’s liberal laws to escape or minimize the punishments for phishing. In view of this,
collaboration between countries is almost imperative for evidence collection and prosecution. The
European Convention on Cybercrime is a good start in international cooperation. Anti-phishing is
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a global need that requires joint effort of individuals and corporate owners. Being part of the
global community, they have responsibilities to fight phishing at all stages, comply with legal
obligations, enhance anti-phishing awareness, and report any incidences of phishing. Legislation
is an important means to deter the crime and punish the adversaries. The key points of the
discussion in this section of the paper are summarized in the form of an anti-phishing framework
that is depicted in Figure 3. It highlights the four different phases of phishing and the most
important anti-phishing activities in each phase. It also relates the legislation that has been
implemented in various parts of the globe as well as the key information technology based antiphishing measures that are discussed in Section V to the various phases of phishing. The
framework shows how corporations and individuals can fulfill their social responsibilities by
counteracting the different phases of phishing.
Table 6. Major IS Security Standards and Areas Related to Anti-Phishing
IS security standards

Areas related to anti-phishing

CERT security practices

In the detect step, transaction monitoring can discover
suspicious behavior and minimize the threat of identity
theft [Allen 2001]

Code of practice for information
security
management
(ISO/IEC
17799)

In the domains of physical and environmental security,
communications and operations management and
access control, there are measures related to protection
against unauthorized access of confidential information
[Saint-Germain 2005]

Common criteria for IT
evaluation (ISO/IEC 15408)

security

Several functional classes such as security audit,
cryptographic support, user data protection, identification
and authentication, security management, privacy and
trusted path/channels are relevant to the areas of antiphishing [Herrmann 2003]

Control objectives for information and
related technology (COBIT)

In the delivery and support domains, control objectives
related to online access control, security surveillance,
authorization procedures, and incident handling are
relevant to anti-phishing. Also, control objectives such as
collection of monitoring data and management reporting
are important for deterring identity theft [Lahti 2005]

Generally accepted system security
principles (GASSP)

Under broad functional principles, categories such as
Information
Management,
Access
Control
and
Information Risk Management require practitioners to
routinely manage and assign levels of sensitivity and
criticality to information assets. Under detailed security
principles, the suggestion of using OTP to control access
to critical information assets is a counter measure to
identity theft [Poore 1999]

Information security forum standard
of good practice (ISF SoGP)

Within security management, the principles and
objectives related to malicious attacks are relevant to
anti-phishing. In the category of networks, network
monitoring, external access, and incident management
are useful practices against unauthorized access to
sensitive information. In the area of systems
development, security awareness and security
audit/review are useful measures to detect suspicious
activities related to identity theft [ISF 2005]
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Preparation
phase

Tools and measures against phishing
1. Traffic flow monitoring (PB)
2. Proactive Web scanning (PB)
3. Anti-malicious software (PD)
4. Password management tools (PD)
5. Trusted path ensured browser (PD)

1.
2.
3.
4.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Legislation against phishing
Anti-fraud ordinances (PB)
Copyright ordinances (PB)
Data privacy ordinances (PD)
Telecommunication privacy ordinances
(PD)
Standards against phishing
GASSP (PD)
ISO/IEC 17799 (PD)
ISO/IEC 15408 (PD)
ISF SoGP (PD)

Mass
broadcast
phase

Prohibition of bogus
Web sites (PB)

Thwarting the
spread of phishing
messages (TS)

Preservation of data
privacy (PD)

Deterrence of
identity theft (DI)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.

Social responsibilities
1. Combat phishing at all stages
2. Relevant legislation
3. Appropriate standards

Mature
phase

Account hijack
phase

Figure 3. Anti-Phishing Framework
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Tools and measures against phishing
Alias email address (TS)
Anti-spam filter (TS)
Digitally signed email (TS)
Email scan (TS)
Transaction log monitoring (DI)
Multifactor authentication (DI)
Poisoning phishing Web (DI)
Zero-knowledge proof (DI)
2-factor authentication (DI)

1.
2.
3.
4.

Legislation against phishing
Anti-spam ordinances (TS)
Anti-crime ordinances (DI)
Anti-theft ordinances (DI)
Anti-fraud ordinances (DI)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Standards against phishing
CERT security practices (DI)
ISO/IEC 17799 (DI)
COBIT (DI)
GASSP (DI)
ISF SoGP (DI)
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VIII. FUTURE TRENDS OF PHISHING AND ANTI-PHISHING
Throughout the past decade, the technologies that support phishing have become more
sophisticated making detection of phishing a difficult endeavor. In this section we discuss the
future trends of phishing and anti-phishing.
CHANGE OF PHISHING MEDIUM
Although e-mails and instant messengers are the major phishing media, they seem to have
saturated. With the advent of mobile technology phishing through Short Messaging System
(SMS) has become available. Recently SMS spam incidences have increased in number. Identity
fraud is also possible via SMS spam. As mobile commerce becomes more and more popular, in
the future phishers can easily forge logos and trademarks of a brand using specially designed
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS).
ZOMBIE PHISHING NETWORK
To hide the IPs of spam servers, phishers set up the servers in a zombie network. Such a
network sends spam by distributing the load and the apparent source of the messages across
many computers. At this time, about 48 percent of spam comes from zombies [Lawton 2005].
Spam that is spread using a zombie network makes detection of the person behind the scene
difficult. This distributed network also reduces the traffic flow and is successful in delivering spam
because ISPs are less likely to block sources that generate low volumes of traffic.
ADVANCED CRIMEWARE
Increasingly phishers are using new crimeware such as Keyloggers, Screen Scrapers, and
malicious JavaScript programs. A keylogger is a program that transmits what a user types using a
keyboard to a remote user. A Screen Scraper transmits information related to the user
surreptitiously. It does not send keystrokes but sends screen dumps to a remote user. Malicious
JavaScript programs are powerful phishing tools. Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks are
forecasted to become more common in future [Hallaraker and Vigna 2005].
INEFFICIENCY OF 2-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
2-factor authentication cannot withstand man-in-the-middle attacks as well as Trojan. For such
attacks, a phisher acts as an invisible middle man between the victim and the genuine company
server. Once the victim gives the password to the server it is intercepted by the phisher and
passed on to the server. The phisher then modifies the server transmission without being noticed
by the end user. For example, the phisher can modify the transaction account number and total
amount of money to be transferred. In this scenario, 2-factor authentication is of no use.
Some new directions of research in the area of anti-phishing are described as follows.
MULTI-CHANNEL AUTHENTICATION
Mizuno et al. proposed a new authentication method that allows the user to verify whether he/she
is connecting to a correct service provider rather than a phishing site using multiple
communication channels [Mizuno et al. 2005]. A server can generate a session ID, and a user
can use a mobile scanner or camera interface to capture the session ID and transmit it to the
service provider. After verification of the registered mobile phone number and session ID, the
service provider can authenticate the user and grant him/her permission to use the authorized
service without supplying the user name or password.

Unveiling the Mask of Phishing: Threats, Preventive Measures, and Responsibilities by I. Bose & A.C.M.
Leung

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 19, 2007) 544-566

562

MULTIPLE CHALLENGE RESPONSE AUTHENTICATION
Verification of the identity of service provider or client requires client authentication and server
authentication. Mizuno et al. demonstrated how the authentication protocols might work using the
mistrusted Internet medium and the trusted mobile phone network. Once an authentication
challenge reaches a mobile phone, one can use a keyboard to input a response. If the challenge
is posed via the Internet, a barcode reader or a camera interface can transmit the data from the
mobile phone to the service provider. However, such a scheme cannot deter man-in-the-middle
attacks [Mizuno et al. 2005].
E-MAIL AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORKS
In order to combat e-mail frauds, three e-mail authentication frameworks are popular:
Pobox.com’s Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Yahoo’s DomainKeys Indentified Mail (DKIM), and
Microsoft’s SenderID Framework (SIDF). They mark an outgoing message with an encrypted key
so that the recipient e-mail server can determine the origin of the e-mail and verify if it matches
what appears in the “From” field. SPF and DKIM are likely to become market leaders [Weiss
2004]. After SIDF combines Microsoft’s Caller ID technology and SPF, it may become the most
popular framework in future [Lawton 2005].
IX. CONCLUSION
Within a decade, phishing has transformed itself from a territorial crime to an international threat.
In this paper, we discussed the various ways in which phishing can take place. The most
common one is via e-mail and instant messenger. Other methods include usage of malicious
programs and pharming. Though phishing methods vary not all of them are flawless and
unavoidable. If one pays attention to the phishing messages received one can easily identify
spelling mistakes and clues such as URL in numeric form. By installing adequate anti-phishing
software and continually updating anti-virus, firewall, anti-spam filter, and other domain-namespecific password management tools, one can minimize the chance of becoming a phish. A
number of distinct anti-phishing techniques are discussed in this paper and their strengths are
compared. As part of their social responsibility, organizations around the globe have adopted
relevant laws and standards to thwart the spread of phishing messages, prohibit bogus Web
sites, preserve data privacy, and deter identity theft. We present an anti-phishing framework that
highlights the various anti-phishing measures that can be adopted to disrupt phishing in its four
phases. In future we envisage phishing is likely to adopt alternative channels like mobile phones
and phishing attacks may be conducted by zombie networks and through XSS. The crime is
becoming more sophisticated and harder to detect but it is encouraging that researchers are
devising new innovative methods to deter the growing online fraud.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group
CA

Certificate Authority

COBIT Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
CSR

Corporate Social Responsibility

DKIM

DomainKeys Indentified Mail

DNS

Domain Name Server

ESP

E-mail Service Provider

GASSP

Generally Accepted System Security Principles

ISF SoGP

Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practice

ISP

Internet Service Provider

OTP

One Time Password

PIN

Personal Identification Number

SIDF

SenderID Framework

SMS

Short Message Service

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol

SPF

Sender Policy Framework

SRD

Synchronized Random Dynamic

SSL

Secure Sockets Layer

URL

Uniform Resource Locator
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